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Nuremberg and Beyond:
Jacob Robinson, International Lawyer
JONATHAN A. BUSH*
Jacob Robinson (1889–1977) was one of the half dozen leading legal intellectuals associated with the Nuremberg trials. He was also arguably the only scholar-activist who was involved in almost every international criminal law and human rights battle in the two decades before
and after 1945. So there is good reason for a Nuremberg symposium to
include a look at his remarkable career in international law and human
rights. This essay will attempt to offer that, after a prefatory word about
the recent and curious turn in Nuremberg scholarship to biography, including of Robinson.
I. THE TURN TO NUREMBERG BIOGRAPHY
A 70th anniversary—what jewelers and caterers call a platinum
anniversary—is a worthy event, but on my bookshelves, there are published volumes commemorating Nuremberg on its 20th, 25th, 40th,
45th, and 50th anniversaries, and many hundreds of other volumes not
tied to a milestone year. Let me begin this sketch of Robinson on the
70th anniversary of Nuremberg by asking what these various books and
articles have addressed over the decades and whether their emphases
have changed, and if so, why.1
It is often said of Nuremberg, as it is of the Holocaust, that partici* Jonathan A. Bush is a lawyer and legal historian in Washington D.C. Thanks to Carole
Fink, Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, Moris Kori, Michael R. Marrus, Henry Mayer, Myra Katz Sibrava, Karin Sibrava-Cherches, and Michael Widener for their generous help, as well as Menachem
Rosensaft and Isabella Nespoli of the World Jewish Congress for commissioning the project and
for assistance on an earlier version of this essay, the editors of the Loyola Los Angeles International & Comparative Law Review for assistance on this version, and the archivists at the three
institutions holding Jacob Robinson’s papers. Special thanks are due to Lydia Deutsch and Edward Tiberiu Popovici for excellent research assistance and to the Loyola editors for patience under difficult circumstances.
1. In the following paragraphs, I use a broad brush to survey the scholarship, and in the
interests of concision give only a few footnotes, chiefly where a particular source has been cited
or is likely to be unfamiliar to legal readers.
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pants and scholars were slow to write its history, but for both topics the
claim is mistaken. In the case of Nuremberg, there were within a few
years of the trial multiple official publications in at least four languages,
with the English-language series published in Nuremberg under the imprint of the United Nations running to fully forty-two volumes. There
were also unofficial compilations of trial evidence commercially published, in some instances by Nuremberg prosecutors.2 Participants wrote
both memoirs and more formal narratives and legal studies.3 The authors ranged from journalists to chaplains, jailers, guards, psychiatrists
and psychologists, researchers and translators, and judges. Defense
counsel and even defendants wrote, including one who finished his account on death row.4 The more eminent participants, the chief prosecutors and judges (and defendants), had the opportunity of speaking to
professional groups and landing book contracts, and most of them
seemed to take up those opportunities and published. By the early 1950s
it would have seemed fair to say that everything about Nuremberg had
been said and that the next steps would be for nations, individually or
through the UN, to draft instruments and initiate cases. Telford Taylor,
chief prosecutor at twelve of the thirteen Nuremberg trials, seemed to
suggest this satiety when he asked in 1952 “[s]hould it be done as a
play, a novel, a history? I don’t want just another book on the legal side,
for Nuremberg was far more than that. It became a sort of institution, set
in the environment of a changing Germany.”5
Nevertheless the legal and historical studies of Nuremberg continued to flow. Some accounts focused not on the trials themselves, their
procedure or rulings, but rather on the oral or written evidence, because
the vast evidence collected for the trials constituted a unique documentation of a fallen government—Nuremberg as trove for historians and
2. NAZI GERMANY’S WAR AGAINST THE JEWS (Seymour Krieger ed., Henry Monsky
foreword, American Jewish Conference 1947); LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS EN FRANCE ET DANS
LES AUTRES PAYS DE L’OUEST PRÉSENTÉE PAR LA FRANCE À NUREMBERG (Henri Monneray ed.,
René Cassin pref., Edgar Faure intro., Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, doc. ser.
2, Éditions du Centre 1947); LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS DANS LES PAYS DE L’EST PRÉSENTÉE À
NUREMBERG (Henri Monneray ed., René Cassin intro., Telford Taylor pref., Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, doc. ser. 5, Éditions du Centre 1949). The French research context is
described in Georges Bensoussan, The Jewish Contemporary Documentation Center (CDJC) and
Holocaust Research in France, 1945–1970, in HOLOCAUST HISTORIOGRAPHY, infra note 38, at
245, 246–47.
3. The best of which is probably PETER CALVOCORESSI, NUREMBERG: THE FACTS, THE
LAW AND THE CONSEQUENCES (Chatto and Windus 1947).
4. WILHELM KEITEL, THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHAL KEITEL 234–38 (Walter Görlitz
ed., David Irving trans., William Kimber 1965).
5. Lewis Nichols, Talk With Telford Taylor, NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 14, 1952,
at VII: 14.
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the first human rights Truth Commission.6 Other accounts were more
conventional legal studies that used Nuremberg to examine doctrines
like reprisal, command responsibility, POW status, or proportionality.
Still other studies were hortatory or politically engaged, applying Nuremberg to the Cold War rivalry and nuclear war, or to Suez, Algeria,
the Vietnam War, Biafra, Cambodia, and other conflicts, or to the military draft. So numerous were these “Never Again” or “Nuremberg
And . . .” studies that when a new conventional narrative of the trials
came out, the “blurbs” often hailed it as the first of its kind.7 All told,
one list in 1979 estimated 3352 books and articles on Nuremberg and
related matters, and another in 1986 gave 4500 items, many of them different, and both lists were surely on the low side.8 Soon the best book on
the topic was published, Telford Taylor’s 1992 account of the first trial,
at which he was a senior associate prosecutor and heir apparent.9
Best book, yes, but hardly the last word. Indeed, Taylor’s book
came out at what proved for wholly unrelated reasons to be the start of a
new torrent of Nuremberg-related scholarship. One source of the new
interest was the demand for a more complete, candid history of the Nazi
era. With the allegations in the mid-1990s of Swiss Bank complicity in
the Holocaust, researchers investigated the banks and almost immediately, other institutions—German industrial companies, French railroads, Italian insurance firms, the German Foreign Office, the Wehrmacht—to see which entities had used slave labor or helped the SS, and
they began by reexamining Nuremberg evidence. A second source of
interest stemmed from the celebratory impulse: by the 1990s, the last of
the Nuremberg lawyers (prosecution but also a few defense counsel)
were alive and still able to fly, speak, be interviewed, and write. With
their unique authenticity in linking Nuremberg accountability to the horrors in Bosnia or Rwanda, they found a ready audience for their speeches and publications. A third source of interest were the new tribunals
created with the end of the Cold War and the return in the Balkans of
genocide to the European heartland. Proponents of the tribunals sought

6. Robert M.W. Kempner, Nuremberg Trials as Sources of Recent German Political and
Historical Materials, 44 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 447 (1950); Telford Taylor, An Outline of the Research and Publication Possibilities of the War Crimes Trials, LOUISIANA L. REV. 496 (1949).
7. See, e.g., the back cover of ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG (Carroll and
Graf Pubs. 1983).
8. UNCERTAIN JUDGMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS (John R. Lewis ed.,
ABC-CLIO 1979); WAR CRIMES, WAR CRIMINALS, AND WAR CRIMES TRIALS: AN ANNOTATED
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE BOOK (Norman E. Tuturow ed., Greenwood Press 1986).
9. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR
(Alfred A. Knopf 1992).
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legitimation and litigants on both sides needed precedent, and Nuremberg was a principal resource. The results of these new streams of interest were not only books and articles, but also specialized journals, law
school degree programs, TV documentaries, and jobs.
Yet after a decade or so of Nuremberg ubiquity, the limits to these
genres started to be clear. The historians looking at German companies
or the Holocaust incorporated Nuremberg evidence, but they turned to
other sources as well and had little interest in the trials as such. The Nuremberg alumni had authenticity and sometimes astonishing anecdotes,
but their writings had a gee-whiz quality, with an author expressing
amazement at the bombed-out condition of the Grand Hotel, or at his
feelings as he stared into the face of evil when he interrogated Goering,
or at being alongside Justice Jackson shoulder-to-shoulder at the birth of
international criminal law. And the few memoirs by top people were
overly discreet.10 In the end, there was little of interest in any of the new
memoirs save Taylor’s.
As for the legal studies of Nuremberg, they too seemed unsatisfying. Too often the work had a “law-office history” flavor, announcing
that “Nuremberg stands for the proposition that . . .” and proving it by
reciting holdings from various of the thirteen trials woven together with
clauses from a Geneva Convention or ICRC handbook seemingly aimed
at Hague judges. If the fault of the historians was that they typically
showed little awareness of the law, asserting that “prosecutors failed to
do X” without realizing that rules of evidence or procedure might have
compelled what to a layman seemed like failure, the lawyers typically
missed critical historical context. And even the best legal studies tended
to reprise easy rulings while ignoring the harder problems at Nuremberg. The legal studies were also replete with a smug confidence that
“Nuremberg was an important first step but flawed and we will do better unless retrograde political forces block us.”
Of course, the preceding sketch is a caricature, and the reader is
free to argue with both its generalizations and chronology. There were
well researched, self-critical books that took legal argument seriously
and wove law and anecdote in historical context. But such accounts
were few, and even ardent supporters of the new international tribunals
may cringe privately at yet another article splitting hairs with or celebrating one of the few rulings by the Hague tribunals or arguing that
Nuremberg requires we pursue accountability for atrocities in (choose a
country). To many readers, it has been a case of too many lawyers with
10. See, e.g., HARTLEY SHAWCROSS, LIFE SENTENCE: THE MEMOIRS OF HARTLEY
SHAWCROSS 85–137 (Constable and Co. 1995).
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the time to write, burning with moral urgency about their topics and
with many venues for publication but few fresh questions to talk about.11
Maybe for these reasons, many of those writing in the field have
sought other ways to address war crimes law. For some, this meant
looking at unfamiliar trials, and an entire cottage industry has grown
where modern international law experts examined “forgotten” trials,
many from mid twentieth-century Asia, the nineteenth-century age of
imperialism, or even medieval warfare. Other scholars addressed specific war crimes trials, something that had been done in the past for the
Nuremberg Medical and Industrialist cases but not for the others. A few
authors actually did write plays or novels as Taylor foresaw fifty years
earlier. But for many in the field, the alternative to writing yet another
book about Nuremberg-As-Modern-Law was a turn to biography.
This has not, however, led to new studies of the leading personalities at Nuremberg or other trials—there is no new major work on figures like Maxwell Fyfe, Telford Taylor, or Airey Neave, nor of any of
the judges. Rather, the focus of recent biography has been the legal
thinkers. Even here, it is only some of them. There is no new work on
Quincy Wright or Herbert Wechsler, leading advisors to the American
judges, or Sheldon Glueck, the Harvard criminologist who had Justice
Jackson’s ear, or Lord Wright, and only a little on Franz Neumann,
whose many involvements with Nuremberg merit fuller study. Instead,
the biographical focus has been on René Cassin and Hans Kelsen, who
were not at Nuremberg but whose work was related, and on three who
were: Raphael Lemkin, the father of the notion of “genocide” and peripheral staff member at and advisor to the U.S. prosecution team,
Hersch Lauterpacht, the international law scholar and advisor to the
British team, and Jacob Robinson. Each of the latter three has been the
subject of multiple studies and of joint and compare-and-contrast accounts as well.
While there is nothing wrong with this turn to biography, especially of a select group of legal theorists, there are risks. Some of the new
biographers fall prey to the occupational disease of exaggerating the
significance of their subject. Their work can read more like hagiography
or a legal brief than like critical scholarship. Their attributions often
confuse chronology for causation and they often credit their subjects
while failing to examine strong arguments for the role of other participants.12 By focusing on this small handful of legal thinkers, such studies
11. Already a dozen years ago one Hague judge privately told this author that he longed for
a five-year moratorium on articles about Joint Criminal Enterprise.
12. Consider a simple example: Lauterpacht is widely acclaimed today as the father of
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tend to minimize the role of other legal scholars, and of non-scholars
whose theoretical contributions to Nuremberg were in many instances at
least as important as those of the theorists: thus, Murray Bernays, William Chanler, Bohuslav Ečer, and others. That said, the biographical
approach allows us to disentangle an enormously complex multinational
project involving hundreds of participants and hundreds of thousands of
pages of evidence without lapsing into hortatory generalizations. It can
allow us to say something fresh about Nuremberg. In that spirit, let us
turn to Jacob Robinson before, at, and after Nuremberg.
II. JACOB ROBINSON: ACHIEVEMENTS AND HISTORIOGRAPHY
Jacob Robinson was arguably the most important and prolific legal
scholar-activist in the Jewish world in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Often working closely with his younger brother, Nehemiah
(1898–1964), Robinson addressed enormous problems, from the rise of
“crimes against humanity” as charged at Nuremberg. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, THE LIFE OF SIR
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, QC, FBA, LLD, at 272 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010); Michael R. Marrus, Three Roads From Nuremberg: Seventy Years to the Day after the Start of the Epochdefining Trials, Three Jewish Advocates Stand Above the Rest: Jacob Robinson, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, and Raphael Lemkin, TABLET, Nov. 20, 2015, http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-artsand-culture/books/195230/three-roads-from-nuremberg; PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET:
ON THE ORIGINS OF “GENOCIDE” AND “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” 3 (Alfred A. Knopf 2016);
Martti Koskenniemi, Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960), in JURISTS UPROOTED: GERMANSPEAKING ÉMIGRÉ LAWYERS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 601, 639–40 (Jack Beatson and
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004). The basis is that Jackson suggested it in
his published transcript (1949) of the London negotiations and that a dozen years later, his son
William, who had been a young assistant to his father, confirmed Lauterpacht’s role in a note to
Jacob Robinson who was then writing a memorial essay about Lauterpacht (1961). Robinson’s
friend Shabtai Rosenne added to the consensus by crediting Robinson with helping the American
team apply “crimes against humanity” specifically to the Holocaust. Shabtai Rosenne, Jacob Robinson: In Memoriam, 13 ISRAEL L. REV. 287, 291 (1978) [hereinafter Rosenne], reprinted in
SHABTAI ROSENNE, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW MISCELLANY 831 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers
1993), and THE LIFE, TIMES AND WORK OF JOKŪBAS ROBINZONAS-JACOB ROBINSON 69 (Eglé
Bendikaité and Dirk Roland Haupt eds., Academia Verlag 2015) [hereinafter “Bendikaité and
Haupt”]. Yet hard evidence is lacking. Lauterpacht talked of crimes against humanity and met
with Jackson at the right time, as did Robinson (as we shall see), and the relevant language did
appear soon after in the Charter. But other participants also wrote about crimes against humanity
and met with Justice Jackson and, crucially, with his aides and the other delegates who negotiated
the language of the Charter. At the time, nobody credited Lauterpacht (or Robinson) with the notion or its inclusion in the Charter: not the two British chief prosecutors for whom Lauterpacht
worked, not the Americans Telford Taylor, who consulted with him, or Sidney Alderman, a lead
drafter of the Charter who also conferred with him. Alderman attributed Nuremberg’s “crimes
against humanity” to one of his French counterparts, while Professor Kochavi credits Polish,
Czech, and Australian delegates to the UN War Crimes Commission. ARIEH J. KOCHAVI,
PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG: ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT
145 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1998). At best, the case for Lauterpacht is speculative and
unproven.
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anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and the destruction of minority rights
in the 1920s, to Nazi expansionism and domestic atrocities in the 1930s
and, then, the Shoah. After the war, he worked to bring war criminals to
justice, arrange restitution and reparations for survivors, revive Jewish
communal life, and gather Holocaust documentation. Robinson participated in the early struggles of the State of Israel at the United Nations
and fought for human rights for Diaspora communities in Eastern and
Western Europe, and North Africa. Working through the Institute of
Jewish Affairs (“IJA”) of the World Jewish Congress, which he, and
then Nehemiah, led for twenty-five years, and later with other groups
and the Foreign Ministry of Israel, Robinson, “the first truly Jewish international jurist of front rank of modern times,” 13 was at the center of
the legal action.14 He was truly “the Formidable Dr. Robinson,” even
though the label was given sarcastically by a bitter foe.15
Yet by 1970, Robinson was—outside of the circle of his aging colleagues—largely forgotten. In later decades, with the explosion of interest in the Holocaust and the turn in Nuremberg scholarship to biography, his work came to be remembered, and he was the subject of a
dozen posthumous essays16—all but two since the turn of the current
13. Rosenne, supra note 12, at 296.
14. Jacob Robinson’s papers, including many of his brother Nehemiah’s papers, are located
in the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives, Washington, D.C., Accession No. 2013.506.1,
http://collections.ushmm.org/findingaids/2013.506.1_01_fnd_en.pdf
[hereinafter
JACOB
ROBINSON PAPERS]; the published records of the Institute of Jewish Affairs (“IJA”) can be found
in a number of places, including the American Jewish Historical Society, Center for Jewish History, New York, http://digifindingaids.cjh.org/?pID=365637 [hereinafter INSTITUTE OF JEWISH
AFFAIRS COLLECTION]; and the papers of the relevant offices of the World Jewish Congress, are
in the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, in Cincinnati, OH,
http://catalog.americanjewisharchives.org/cgi- bin/ajagw/chameleon [hereinafter WORLD JEWISH
CONGRESS PAPERS]. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of archivists at all three institutions.
15. Hannah Arendt, “The Formidable Dr. Robinson”: A Reply, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan.
20, 1966, at 26–30, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1966/01/20/the-formidable-dr-robinson-areply/, reprinted in THE JEW AS PARIAH 260–76 (Ron H. Feldman ed., Grove Press, Inc. 1978),
and HANNAH ARENDT, THE JEWISH WRITINGS 496–511 (Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman eds.,
Schocken Books 2007).
16. For works with significant discussions of Jacob Robinson at Nuremberg, see, e.g.,
Shlomo Aronson, Preparations for the Nuremberg Trial: The O.S.S., Charles Dwork, and the
Holocaust, 12 HOLOCAUST & GENOCIDE STUD. 257, 264–65 (1998); Boaz Cohen, Dr. Jacob
Robinson, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, and the Elusive Jewish Voice in Nuremberg, in
HOLOCAUST AND JUSTICE: REPRESENTATION AND HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE HOLOCAUST IN
POST-WAR TRIALS 81–100 (David Bankier & Dan Michman eds., 2010); Laura Jockusch, Justice
at Nuremburg?: Jewish Responses to Nazi War-Crime Trials in Allied Occupied Germany, 19
JEWISH SOC. STUD., Fall 2012, at 107, 111–17; Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, Im Dienste der
jüdischen Nation: Jacob Robinson und das Völkerrecht, in OSTEUROPA 2008, IMPULSES FOR
EUROPE 8–10, 279–94 (2008) (translated as Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, At the Service of the Jewish Nation: Jacob Robinson and International Law, in OSTEUROPA 2008, IMPULSES FOR EUROPE
157–70 (2008); Geschichtserfahrung und Völkerrecht: Jacob Robinson und die Gründung des
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century—as well as of a conference with published proceedings devoted
to his life.17 Although he is discussed here and more briefly in dozens of
other essays and monographs, it is chiefly for the same two activities:
(1) as an advisor to American prosecutors at the first four-power Nuremberg trial (1945–1946); and (2) for his work with Israeli prosecutors
in the Eichmann trial (1961), the integrity of which he vigorously defended. His contributions to both trials were important, but the emphasis
says more about the recent revival of international criminal law than it
does about Robinson’s extraordinary and diverse career of scholarly
Jewish advocacy.
III. JACOB ROBINSON’S CAREER BEFORE NUREMBERG
Robinson was born in Seirijai, a small town in southern Lithuania,
on November 26, 1889; one of seven sons born to David and Bluma
Robinson. It was an observant family, descended from rabbis going
back to Yom Tov Lipmann Heller in the seventeenth century. But as
Robinson’s biographer Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen concludes, it was also
progressive and engaged in the secular world. Robinson’s father was an
early Zionist who is said to have represented his community before
both the kaiser and the tsar, and his uncle was one of the first Jewish
researchers in Russia, a pathologist who led the Institute for Experi-

Institute of Jewish Affairs, in 2 LEIPZIGER BEITRÄGE ZUR JÜDISCHEN GESCHICHTE UND KULTUR
307–27 (Dan Diner ed., 2004); Omry Kaplan-Feuereisen, Jacob Robinson, in 1 YIVO
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWS IN EASTERN EUROPE 1567–68 (Yale Univ. Press 2008); Mark A. Lewis,
The World Jewish Congress and the Institute of Jewish Affairs at Nuremberg: Ideas, Strategies,
and Political Goals, 1942–1946, 36 YAD VASHEM STUD. 181 (2008), adapted in THE BIRTH OF
THE NEW JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT, 1919–1950, at
150–80 (Oxford Univ. Press 2014); Michael R. Marrus, Three Jewish Émigrés at Nuremberg:
Hersch Lauterpacht, Jacob Robinson, and Raphael Lemkin, in AGAINST THE GRAIN: JEWISH
INTELLECTUALS IN HARD TIMES 240–54 (Ezra Mendelsohn, Steffani Hoffman & Richard Cohen
eds., Berghahn Books 2014) (a shortened version can be found in Three Roads to Nuremberg,
supra note 12); Michael R. Marrus, A Jewish Lobby at Nuremberg: Jacob Robinson and the Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1945–46, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1651, 1651–65 (2006) (a shorter version
can be found in THE NUREMBERG TRIALS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SINCE 1945: 60TH
ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE/DIE NÜRNBERGER PROZESSE 63–72 (Herbert R. Reginbogin &
Christoph J.M. Safferling eds., K.G. Saur 2006)), reprinted sub nom. Jacob Robinson and the
Holocaust at the Nuremberg Trials in Bendikaité and Haupt, supra note 12, at 87–110 [hereinafter Jacob Robinson and the Holocaust]; Michael R. Marrus, The Holocaust at Nuremberg, 28
YAD VASHEM STUDIES 5 (1998), http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20%203220.pdf; Maurice Perlzweig, s.v., Robinson, Jacob, in 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA col. 207
(2d ed. 1971); Rosenne, supra note 12, at 291; Gil Rubin, The End of Minority Rights: Jacob
Robinson and the ‘Jewish Question’ in World War II, in 11 SIMON DUBNOW INST. Y.B. 55–71
(2012).
17. The proceedings of the 2007 conference were published as Bendikaitė and Haupt, supra
note 12.
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mental Medicine and was a guest of the last tsar.18 Robinson received a
traditional Jewish education from a tutor in Vishtinets, and went to secondary school in the larger town of Suvalki. Conscripted into the Russian army in 1914 after earning the equivalent of a doctorate in law at
the University of Warsaw, Robinson was captured and spent three years
as a German prisoner of war. Upon his release, he and his wife Clara
settled in the Lithuanian city of Virbalis, where he founded and ran a
Hebrew gymnasium. He was admitted to the Bar; moved to Kaunas
(Kovno); began a legal practice that Nehemiah later joined in 1927; coedited a Yiddish newspaper; and in 1923, was elected to the second
Lithuanian parliament (Seimas) as one of seven Jewish members. He
was the leader of both the Jewish faction and the minorities caucus for
the parliament, posts he held until its dissolution in a December 1926
coup.19
The dissolution of the Seimas marked the start of the next phase of
Robinson’s communal activism. On the international Jewish stage, he
was active with the Paris-based Committee for Jewish Delegations, established in 1919 to represent Jewish interests at the Peace Conference,
and participated in the early efforts to organize the World Jewish Congress (1927–1936). He is even credited with the idea for the Bernheim
Petition (1933), a novel legal proceeding in which an exiled German
Jew used a treaty to win a League of Nations ruling against Germany.20
18. See Im Dienste der jüdischen Nation: Jacob Robinson und das Völkerrecht, supra note
16; Bendikaité and Haupt, supra note 12, at 3–16 (Introduction). This and the following paragraph are drawn from various sketches by Kaplan-Feuereisen, Jacob Robinson, supra note 16.
David Robinson’s representations are cited in Rosenne, supra note 12, at 287.
19. See Saulius Kaubrys, Jokūbas Robinzonas – A Member of the Second and Third Seimas:
Anatomy of Action and Experience, in Bendikaité and Haupt, supra note 12, at 19–38. For the
political context, see JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD
WARS 378–79 (Peter F. Sugar and Donald W. Treadgold eds., Univ. of Washington Press 1974).
20. See Philipp Graf, The Bernheim Petition 1933: Jacob Robinson’s Contribution to Jewish
Minority Diplomacy in the Interwar Years, in Bendikaité and Haupt, supra note 12, at 179–94;
and the study by Jacob Robinson’s colleague in Lithuanian Government and on the Committee,
NATHAN FEINBERG, THE JEWISH CAMPAIGN AGAINST HITLER AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (THE
BERNHEIM PETITION) (Yad Vashem 1957) [Heb.]. The case is reported at Harry Schneiderman,
Review of the Year [Jul. 1, 1932–Jun. 30, 1933], in 35 AMERICAN JEWISH Y.B. 5694, at 21, app.
at 74–101 (Harry Scheiderman ed., American Jewish Committee 1933–1934). Robinson and various Jewish organizations helped Bernheim bring an individual petition arguing that as an Upper
Silesian, he was protected by the German-Polish Agreement on Upper Silesia (1922). Embarrassed by this legal scrutiny so soon after coming to power, the Nazis suspended certain racist
laws in that territory until 1937. See A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF
EMPIRE 142–45 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); CAROLE FINK, DEFENDING THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS:
THE GREAT POWERS, THE JEWS, AND INTERNATIONAL MINORITY PROTECTION, 1878–1938, at
331–32 (Harv. Univ. Press 2004); Rubin, supra note 16, at 57; Johann Wolfgang Brugel, The
Bernheim Petition: A Challenge to Nazi Germany in 1933, 17 PATTERNS OF PREJUDICE 17–
25 (1983); Greg Burgess, The Human Rights Dilemma in Anti-Nazi Protest: The Bernheim
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At home, Robinson organized an informal group to promote Jewish
rights and was loosely involved in Zionist activities.21 At the same time,
he served as legal advisor to the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry (1931–
1933); was his country’s representative on the German-Lithuanian Permanent Conciliation Committee (1931); and helped present the country’s successful claim at the Permanent Court of International Justice
(“PCIJ”) in the important Memel case (1932).22
The German invasion of Poland did not immediately bring Lithuania into the war,23 but Robinson knew that his country was unlikely to
be safe for long.24 Around May 1940, he, his wife, and their two daughters were granted visas to the United States, but because they gave their
tickets to two young students, their arrival was delayed until December.
Within a few months, the World Jewish Congress (“WJC”) and the
American Jewish Congress announced, through Rabbi Stephen S. Wise,
the establishment of the IJA, based in New York and led by Robinson.
The IJA was the first Jewish think tank addressing Nazism and war.25 It
faced a huge agenda with a tiny staff of refugee intellectuals, including
Jacob’s brother Nehemiah, who started working at the WJC/IJA soon

Petition, Minorities Protection, and the 1933 Sessions of the League of Nations (Contemporary Europe Reseach Centre, CERC Working Papers Series No. 2/2002).
21. Eglé Bendikaité, Politician Without Political Party: A Zionist Appraisal of Jacob Robinson’s Activities in the Public Life of Lithuania, in Bendikaité and Haupt, supra note 12, at 39–66.
22. Formerly a part of the Russian Empire and with an ethnic German majority, Memel was
coveted by Poland and Germany but assigned to Lithuania under the five-power Allied oversight
(1922). When German local officials made surreptitious visits to Germany, Lithuania removed
them, prompting the five guarantors to seek a ruling about Memel’s autonomy. The PCIJ rejected
Robinson’s reasoning but largely accepted his conclusion that Lithuania, as sovereign, had a right
to supervise its restive enclave, which it did until Hitler demanded and was ceded the territory in
March 1939. Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, Advisory Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 47 (Aug. 11, 1932); Interpretation of the Statute of the Memel Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 49 (Aug. 11, 1932). The case was Robinson’s first appearance at the international court and became the occasion of his massive two-volume book on the
Memel problem (1934). For Robinson’s appearances at other international cases in this period, see
Rosenne, supra note 12, at 289 n.1.
23. Robinson and his lobbying group pressed Lithuania to receive Jewish refugees from Poland, as noted in Kaplan-Feuereisen, Jacob Robinson, supra note 16, at 1567–68.
24. While in the town of Vichy, France, in autumn 1939, Robinson unsuccessfully used his
contacts with diplomats and a U.S. senator to try to obtain refugee status in the United States,
France, Denmark, and probably elsewhere. See JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 1, folder 11
(Documents Related to Immigration (1911–1955)). When these efforts failed, he returned to Lithuania, where a few months later he received his U.S. visa.
25. Sources vary on its inception—February 1941, Spring 1940, and in one place Robinson
even says that he and Wise planned it in April 1939 to be based in Geneva—and it was reconfigured in early 1942. But regardless, the IJA seems to have pre-dated other research and advocacy
groups such as the American Jewish Committee’s Institute on Peace and Postwar Problems and
the Jewish Labor Committee’s Research Institute for Jewish Postwar Problems.
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after.26 From its modest beginning, the IJA began a substantial program
of research and publications that would continue throughout the war and
long after.
The IJA’s best-known book from the war years is probably Hitler’s Ten-Year War on the Jews (1943), a useful book akin to Franz
Neumann’s Behemoth or Raphael Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, albeit with more solid research and less theoretical flash. An even
more significant book may be the IJA’s little-remembered first work,
Jews in Nazi Europe, February 1933 to November 1941, prepared for
the Inter-American Jewish Conference in Baltimore in November 1941,
at which Wise and U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles were
the principal speakers. Circulated in mimeo for speedier dissemination,
the book compiled Jewish human and material losses on a country-bycountry basis and seems to have been the first study to show the scale of
the Holocaust as it was about to enter its most murderous phase. And
although it was mistaken about some details, cautiously offering figures
that erred on the low side, and relied in its methodology on published
scraps of information, official estimates and leaks, and escapee accounts, the book was a clarion call not only for outrage among the delegates, but also for further research.
Robinson wrote a book on the legal issues of the British Mandate,
opposing the closure of immigration to Palestine. In another one of his
books, Were the Minority Treaties a Failure? (1943), he drew on his
positions in the Memel case to argue for the efficacy of better-designed
minorities treaties. His brother Nehemiah, who had studied law at Berlin and Jena and practiced law with Jacob in Kaunas in the 1920s, soon
wrote one of its earliest and finest books, Indemnification and Reparations: Jewish Aspects (1944), which deals with legal issues relating to
Jewish losses. Together with their half-dozen colleagues and outside allies, the two Robinsons also wrote about refugees and migration, restitution, cultural revival, Zionism, federalism, the organization of a proposed United Nations, assimilation, human rights, treaty protections,
German demilitarization and rehabilitation, and Soviet Jewry. They
shared data with and lobbied labor unions, Christian groups, and university experts, and worked with the WJC’s Political Section and British
Section despite having different emphases.27 Jacob frequently wrote in
26. The staff roster is given in IJA, Report of the Institute of Jewish Affairs for the Period
February 1, 1941 – April 30, 1947, Appendix II: Former Members of the Professional Staff,
1941–1946. One young staff member—we would call him an intern—was high school student
Alexander Bickel, later the eminent Yale constitutional scholar.
27. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 16, at 162–63 (disagreement whether to press for a Jewish
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Congress Weekly and other Jewish publications, gave courses on nationalism and minority protections to students and officer candidates at
Columbia University, and played a prominent role at the WJC’s War
Emergency Conference in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in November
1944, which adopted an eleven-point program for war crimes accountability and another on reparations.28
Looking at Jacob’s prominent writings and speeches from the period, one scholar has identified a shift in his wartime views from advocating reconstruction of Jewish life with treaty protections in a postwar
Europe, to robust Zionism. Another argues that the IJA shifted from
policy advocacy to Holocaust documentation as the extent of the “Final
Solution” became known.29 But a different case can also be made from
the writings by the Robinson brothers and their colleagues at the IJA.
They were part of an entire generation of émigré lawyers and intellectuals, most but not all German or Austrian and living in the U.S., most
fearful that their extended families were dead, all too old for active military service but eager to contribute, and some with full- or part-time
wartime jobs with government. All were searching for answers to “the
Problem of Germany” and “What Next?” Only a handful of these dozens of individuals—René Cassin, Franz Neumann, Hersch Lauterpacht,
Hans Morgenthau, Hans Kelsen, and Raphael Lemkin—are familiar today. Some started with policy preferences, as Jacob Robinson did with
minority rights treaties, and some became entrepreneurs for particular
theories or approaches, most famously Lemkin with his notion of genocide or Vishniak with his proposal for an international convention
against anti-Semitism,30 but those of a pragmatic bent, including the
Robinsons, soon promoted more than one policy prescription. With authors such as the Robinsons, who wrote so much and so often with each
other and other co-authors, it is particularly difficult to see a trend in
their policy commitments or methodologies. Still, it is not unlikely that
with each new set of death estimates making the idea of renewed Jewish
life in Eastern Europe less plausible, their commitment to Zionism, as

official prosecutor of war crimes).
28. The reparation clauses also were drafted by Jacob Robinson. See NANA SAGI, GERMAN
REPARATIONS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS 24–26 (Dafna Alon trans., Magnes Press, Hebrew University 1980). These and many other of Robinson’s wartime publications are collected in JACOB
ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 4, folder 10.
29. Some of these agendas within the IJA are discussed in Rubin, supra note 16, at 55–61,
68–70; MARK MAZOWER, NO ENCHANTED PALACE: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 121–22 (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
30. Later published as MARK VISHNIAK, AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AGAINST
ANTISEMITISM (Research Institute of the Jewish Labor Committee 1946).
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well as to Diaspora life in a liberal North America and to legal accountability for the Holocaust, grew.
IV. JACOB ROBINSON AND THE NUREMBERG TRIALS
In May 1945, Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson was announced as head of U.S. planning for war crimes policy. Later, when a
trial plan for prominent Nazi war criminals was agreed upon with the
major Allies, Jackson became the chief U.S. prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg (November 1945–
October 1946). Jacob Robinson was an advisor to Jackson and, for the
rest of his life, was proud to identify himself as such. In many ways, he
was an ideal choice for Nuremberg: his work at the IJA meant he had
sources about the Holocaust that complemented what the Allied governments knew, and his writings on, and practice in, prewar international tribunals were unrivaled by the U.S. staff.
A trail of memos illustrates Robinson’s role. In June 1945, newly
returned from San Francisco, where he was a WJC observer at the conference that founded the United Nations, Robinson met with Jackson
and, soon after, was introduced to Charles Irving Dwork and Abraham
Duker. Dwork and Duker were two Jewish staff members who worked
at the “Jewish Desk” for the Office of Special Services (“O.S.S.”), the
wartime intelligence agency whose chief, General William O. Donovan,
was now U.S. Deputy Chief Prosecutor and was sharing his agency’s
resources with the Nuremberg effort.31 It was most likely Robinson and
his IJA colleagues who prepared the comprehensive plan that Dwork
proposed for viewing the Holocaust as a criminal conspiracy.
In June, Robinson also took on the task of assembling reliable
Holocaust estimates for presentation at trial for Jackson. He urged Jackson to consider including a Jewish chief prosecutor or official representative; giving the court an official Jewish submission amicus curiae;
and above all, seeing the atrocities against Jews as a planned crime
against a collectivity, a people, rather than a vast number of individual
atrocities—all three points were agreed upon at the Atlantic City conference.32 Upon hearing rumors of the names of possible defendants,
31. Aronson, supra note 16, at 257; Cohen, supra note 16, at 90–91.
32. Minutes, Meeting of World Jewish Congress with Justice Robert H. Jackson in New
York City, June 12, 1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader
Marcus
Center
of
the
American
Jewish
Archives),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?do
cumentdate=1945-06-12&documentid=C106-16-5&pagenumber=1. The IJA had, by then, accepted the British Section’s proposal for a Jewish prosecutor though that Section previously had
no luck in lobbying the UN War Crimes Commission in London to accept the view. See Lewis,
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Robinson wrote Jackson in late July to urge that Adolf Eichmann be included alongside the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was already under
consideration. Emphasizing that, “it has to date not been made public
what has happened to Eichmann,” he summarized Eichmann’s enormous role in the Holocaust.33
Throughout the summer of 1945, Robinson, Cambridge Professor
Hersch Lauterpacht, and a few others continued maneuvering to have a
co-equal Jewish chief prosecutor, or a Jewish official witness who
would testify—perhaps Chaim Weizmann—or both,34 and Robinson
took the occasion of meeting Weizmann to discuss issues of restitution
and reparations. In October 1945, Robinson lectured members of the
U.S. team who were still in London,35 and in mid to late November, he
was in Nuremberg working with the small team under Major William
Walsh to prepare the American presentation of what euphemistically
was called “the Persecution of the Jews.” In December 1945, he went
home and later reported to the WJC on his time at and impressions of
Nuremberg, and returned briefly to Nuremberg in the summer of 1946.36
supra note 16, at 162–66.
33. Letter from Jacob Robinson to Robert H. Jackson, July 27, 1945, WORLD JEWISH
CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?do
cumentdate=1945-07-27&documentid=C106-16-2&pagenumber=1. WJC staffers continued for a
few weeks to press for the inclusion of the Grand Mufti in the trial. See Internal Memorandum
from Dr. Jacoby and Dr. Sinder to Jacob Robinson, August 3, 1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-08-03&documentid=C106-18-5&pagenumber=1.
34. The issues are discussed in an unsigned report entitled: “Some Basic Ideas with Regard
to the Appearance of a Jewish Witness at the International Military Tribunal”, September 5, 1945.
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American
Jewish
Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-09-05&documentid=C107-8-1&pagenumber=1.
35. As late as October 19 the WJC was still asking for permission for Robinson and Easterman to go to Nuremberg. See Letter from Stephen S. Wise to Robert P. Patterson, October 17,
1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the
American
Jewish
Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-10-17&documentid=C107-8-2&pagenumber=1.
36. See Organizational Literature, INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box 1,
folder 3 (documenting Robinson’s travels to London and Nuremberg); Report from Jacob Robinson to the World Jewish Congress, December 6, 1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on
file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-12-06&documentid=C14-16-1&pagenumber=1; and Minutes of Office
Committee Meeting, World Jewish Congress, December 10, 1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
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That is the measure of Robinson’s direct involvement at Nuremberg, and unfortunately, while there is proof of his presence and numerous memoranda, there is little evidence of his significance, that is,
whether his and his colleagues’ advice was heeded.37 Because of this,
some scholars have emphasized Robinson’s role at Nuremberg, extrapolating from his memos and meetings with more enthusiasm than evidence. Others have concluded that Robinson and other Jewish advocates
made little imprint. They argue, however, this stemmed not from lack of
effort, but rather from Nuremberg’s blindness to the centrality of what
would become known as the Holocaust, and from the absence of a Jewish voice and evidence at Nuremberg—a characterization that became
conventional wisdom by the time of the Eichmann trial fifteen years later and is still widely accepted.38 In this view, the charge against Nuremberg is twofold: that there were few Jewish participants and not enough
focus on the Holocaust.

PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-12-10&documentid=C14-16-2&pagenumber=1.
37. There are approximately two dozen memos between Robinson and other Jewish organizational leaders and the Nuremberg prosecutors and another few dozen between WJC and IJA staff
members
that
can
be
viewed
at:
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/index.php?action=docs.
But there is scant evidence whether these Jewish organizational efforts were adopted by the four
prosecution teams. Even if we go beyond the Robinson memos and O.S.S. research to examine
items such as (i) favorable references to Robinson in the diary of Seymour Krieger, a prosecutor
working for Walsh on the Holocaust case, or (ii) to British WJC leader A.L. Easterman’s participation, or (iii) the various thank-you notes from Jackson, Lauterpacht, and Glueck, JACOB
ROBINSON PAPERS, box 5, folders 5 & 6, the case for Jewish organizational significance is unclear. On the contrary, there is evidence that from the start Jewish groups felt frustrated by the way
Nuremberg staffers were not following their advice. See Letter from Jacob Robinson to Irving
Dwork, June 23, 1945, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus
Center
of
the
American
Jewish
Archives),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/index.php. Only occasionally is there direct evidence that IJA material reached top prosecutors, either directly or indirectly, through O.S.S. staffers. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, “Progress Report No. 5” [minutes of
planning Committee 2 and 3], 2, no. 12 (Sept. 4, 1945), TELFORD TAYLOR PAPERS, 1918–1998,
at box 298 (on file with Columbia University Library) [hereinafter TELFORD TAYLOR PAPERS].
38. See, e.g., Aronson, supra note 16; Cohen, supra note 16; Jockusch, supra note 16; Three
Jewish Émigrés at Nuremberg, supra note 16; A Jewish Lobby at Nuremberg, supra note 16;
Donald Bloxham, Jewish Witnesses in War Crimes Trials of the Postwar Era, in HOLOCAUST
HISTORIOGRAPHY IN CONTEXT: EMERGENCE, CHALLENGES, POLEMICS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
540 (David Bankier & Dan Michman eds., Yad Vashem and Berghahn Books 2008) [hereinafter
HOLOCAUST HISTORIOGRAPHY]; DONALD BLOXHAM, GENOCIDE ON TRIAL: WAR CRIMES
TRIALS AND THE FORMATION OF HOLOCAUST HISTORY AND MEMORY 64–68, 101–115, 124
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter GENOCIDE ON TRIAL]; LAWRENCE DOUGLAS, THE
MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LAW AND HISTORY IN THE TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST 60,
66, 72, 78–80 (Yale Univ. Press 2005).
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The truth about Jewish voices and influence at Nuremberg lies
somewhere in between. Robinson and Jewish groups were right to feel
that the Holocaust was not the focus of the trial. The largely American
notion of deeming the war itself the supreme crime and encompassing
everything related to it, including the Holocaust, into a criminal conspiracy model, had been developed in autumn 1944; adopted by two
successive presidents and Jackson; imposed on skeptical or surprised
allies at the UN meeting in San Francisco; and adopted at the London
planning meetings.39 Even where theories advocated by Jewish groups
were adopted, such as the demand, since 1942, of the British Section of
the WJC that postwar accountability include wrongs done (1) prior to
the war, (2) to enemy nationals (German and Austrian Jews), and (3)
with the aim of exterminating whole peoples—in short, even where
Jewish groups anticipated “crimes against humanity” and “genocide”—
it was a case of post hoc, ergo propter hoc: Nuremberg planners arrived
at the same place independently and without evidence that they heeded
Jewish proposals.40
Despite this familiar story, Robinson’s gloomy view that Jewish
perspectives and voices were being ignored—the view widely accepted
today—was also wrong in many ways. Allied prosecutors did seek out
émigrés—mainly German Jewish lawyers, political scientists, and historians—who could verify facts rather than legal theory, which is why
Robinson himself was prized for his ability to document the hard figures
of Holocaust deaths. The British staff does not appear to have consulted
any scholars or émigrés aside from Lauterpacht, but the far larger American legal team from the start sought help from refugee scholars and

39. See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in International
Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094, 1137–38, 1140–43
(2009) [hereinafter Corporations and Conspiracy]; Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime”
and Its Origins: The Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 8 COLUM. L. REV.
2324, 2353–70 (2002) [hereinafter The Supreme . . . Crime].
40. For wartime advocacy of these theories, see Kochavi, supra note 12, at 163 (Easterman
pressing UN War Crimes Commission on the centrality of crimes against Jews), and Lewis, supra
note 16, at 162–64. Even when he was back in New York briefing his colleagues on Nuremberg, Robinson could not have known that he had it upside down in attributing Jackson’s theories to UN
War Crimes Commission delegates, Marcel de Baer and Bohuslav Ečer, rather than War Department planners in Secretary Stimson’s office. Compare Report, Jacob Robinson, Minutes of the
Office Committee Meeting, World Jewish Congress, December 10, 1945, WORLD JEWISH
CONGRESS PAPERS (on file with The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?do
cumentdate=1945-12-10&documentid=C14-16-2&pagenumber=1 [hereinafter Minutes of the
Office Committee Meeting], with The Supreme . . . Crime, supra note 39, at 2342–43, 2346–66.
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others.41 The most important refugee to whom they turned was not an
academic or someone connected to Jewish think tanks, but Robert M.W.
Kempner, who had been ousted from the Prussian civil service and became a ranking prosecutor in both the IMT and the later Nuremberg trials; he showed his worth by discovering both papers connecting field
marshals on the Eastern Front to the Einsatzgruppen and what is still the
only extant copy of the Wannsee Protocol.42 Aside from Kempner, prosecutors seemed to feel, as litigators temperamentally do, that they did
not need outside help, either from new co-equal prosecutors or official
witnesses, as Robinson had hoped,43 or from outside advisors. Robinson,
Lauterpacht, Lemkin, Glueck, Kelsen, and other eminences were consulted a few times, met chief or deputy prosecutors, and left—and were
heartily thanked—with the theories that had preceded them largely unchanged.
None of which is to say that Jewish voices or concerns were not
heeded. There were dozens of American Jewish staff prosecutors, investigators, and researchers on the large U.S. team.44 Their backgrounds
41. Associate prosecutor Sidney Alderman recalled the early search for these experts in Sidney S. Alderman, Reminiscences of Sidney Sherrill Alderman: Oral History 854–70 (1953) (on
file with Columbia University Library). Of the scholars involved, the most important was probably
Harvard criminologist Sheldon Glueck, described in The Supreme . . . Crime, supra note 39, at
2343–45, 2350, 2360–61, 2368. Kelsen’s work is cited in id. at 2368 n.132.
42. See generally ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS, supra note 9, at 520; Letter from
Benjamin Ferencz to Robert Kempner, Dec. 13, 1989, TELFORD TAYLOR PAPERS, at box 270, 201-3-34.
43. Proposals for a Jewish co-chief prosecutor were spurned, as were similar requests by
Czech, Polish, and Yugoslav leaders. Bloxham concludes that the refusals were based on different
reasons in the case of the Jews, and that the Robinson–Lauterpacht idea was rejected because of
the Allies’ inability to see Jewish identity as anything but a religious faith whose adherents had
been singled out by the Nazis, see GENOCIDE ON TRIAL, supra note 38, at 67; Jewish Witnesses,
in HOLOCAUST AND HISTORIOGRAPHY, supra note 38, at 548–49, and there is something to that.
Compare the two different sets of notes kept for the same high-level meeting at which Allied delegates rejected the notion of an official Jewish prosecutor: the American team raised questions of
policy, while the British team treated the idea with contempt and more than a whiff of antiSemitism. Progress Report No. 4 Subcommittee 2 & 3, Sept. 4, 1945, TELFORD TAYLOR PAPERS,
at box 298, unnumbered folder “International Indictment-drafting Committees—minutes”. As for
an official Jewish witness, whether Weizmann or Joseph Proskauer, president of the American
Jewish Committee, the idea could easily have backfired at the hands of a defense counsel skillful
at cross-examination.
44. Later research has shown that both Jackson and a senior associate, Executive Counsel
Thomas Dodd, preferred to avoid having too many Jews on staff, especially on the Holocaust portion of the case. Jockusch, supra note 16, at 116–18; Jewish Witnesses, in HOLOCAUST AND
HISTORIOGRAPHY, supra note 38, at 549. That notwithstanding, there were many Jewish lawyers
on the U.S. team, both on the Jewish portion of the case (Seymour Krieger, Isaac Stone, Joseph
Dainow), and throughout the higher echelons where strategy was developed (Murray Bernays,
Benjamin and Sidney Kaplan, and Murray Gurfein, who had been on the IJA board in 1941). Attempts to count Jews on staff, as some scholars do, are misleading because they exaggerate Jewish
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ranged from assimilated but professional New Deal lawyers, to more
strongly observant Jews who were deeply committed to the specifically
Holocaust dimensions of the case. Jewish and other survivors were not
needed to testify in open court in a trial of German leaders, many of
whom had never been to a ghetto or extermination camp. What was
needed was testimony from knowledgeable senior Germans who could
incriminate their colleagues, and this was gradually found in witnesses
such as S.S. officers Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski and Otto Ohlendorf
and diplomat Hans Gisevius.45 Documentary proof was needed even
more and was found by scores of investigators. A sequence of American
prosecutors assembled hard documentary evidence specifically about
the Holocaust.46 Other delegations, especially the Soviets, did so as well.
In the end, the Holocaust featured prominently at Nuremberg. It was inescapable in the trial record. The extent to which an explicit Jewish
voice was not featured or a story not told was due to the trial’s legal
premises about aggression and lawyers’ self-confidence, and to a larger
setback handed to Robinson and allies by the judges. Erring on the side
of caution, the judges ruled that with a few exceptions they lacked jurisdiction over conspiracy to commit war crimes or crimes against humanity and over prewar atrocities.47 Both were bitter blows to the prosecution, and even more so to Robinson, for whom a conspiracy or central
plan against Jews was the heart of the case. But even the Tribunal could

significance by counting junior and support staff or persons in titular authority only, or they omit
staffers who had Jewish family (Elwyn Jones) or were otherwise wholeheartedly sympathetic to
the Holocaust case. Those who count also assume that a Jewish background signifies an agenda or
single perspective. What matters is not the layered Jewish identities of the senior staff, but rather
the support many shared for the Jewish dimensions of the case.
45. This is not to deny that prosecutors seem to have avoided using Jewish survivor witnesses
for various reasons, few of them defensible, ranging from real or perceived courtroom advantage
to anti-Semitism. Jewish Witnesses, in HOLOCAUST AND HISTORIOGRAPHY, supra note 38, at
540, 548–49. This is especially true of the French team, whose portion of the case included atrocities and
who almost exclusively used non-Jewish survivor witnesses, but also the British lawyers, who had an aversion to the WJC. Nevertheless, survivors were not generally needed for the case that the Allies, for
better or worse, had ambitiously chosen to bring.
46. Telford Taylor was the first American liaison to the Polish and Soviet teams, and he
brought Lemkin and Seymour Krieger to meet Polish historian Philip Friedman (with whom Robinson later published Holocaust documentation). See Memorandum from Telford Taylor, German
Atrocities in Poland, September 1, 1945, K. LINCOLN PAPERS, War Crimes File, Evidence—
Major War Criminals [Folder 3] (on file with Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum & Library),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1945-09-01&documentid=19-4&pagenumber=1. Other lawyers who later focused
on the Holocaust included Brady Bryson and William Walsh and his team.
47. See Corporations and Conspiracy, supra note 39, at 1160–73 (describing narrow IMT
rulings and contemporary reactions). More than most contemporary observers, Robinson immediately saw and criticized these devastating jurisdictional rulings.
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not and did not want to minimize the Holocaust.
All this is to skip ahead somewhat. Back in the early months of the
trial, when Robinson had only just returned from Nuremberg, he briefed
his WJC and IJA colleagues about the trial and offered his critical view
that while in principle the trial was important and even historic, insufficient attention was given to the Holocaust, and there was a second-rate
quality to the American prosecutors presenting that case. In his confidential report, Robinson told colleagues that Jackson was “tremendous”
and an ally,48 but that the trial premises he espoused derived from the
UN War Crimes Commission; the U.S. team was estranged from the
others; the resignation of Deputy U.S. Chief Donovan had significance;
the French team might be the most supportive of the Holocaust case because of the Jewish background of alternate judge Robert Falco; the
broad expertise of the British prosecutors meant they would also be effective allies; the Americans would be of little help because many of the
staff were junior and second-rate and because no Jew had been assigned
a speaking role in the case in chief; and, lastly, the composition of the
prosecution demonstrates that, overall, “[w]e are witnessing the ebb of
Jewish influence in the world.”49 As it happens, he was almost completely wrong in these conclusions. Nevertheless, Robinson, as well as
the WJC, followed the trials closely and kept this overall view for the
next few years. In the winter of 1945 and spring of 1946, Robinson
could not have known that Nuremberg would address the Holocaust
with condemnation and stiff sentences, albeit with complicated and
mixed legal rulings; nor could he have known that a number of the
prosecutors and consultants on the Holocaust portion of the case would
make important contributions to later trials or to the first wave of Holocaust scholarship.50
Robinson also could not have known that, early in the second
round of Nuremberg trials (1946–1949), chief prosecutor Telford Taylor
48. Thus echoing a view that their president Rabbi Wise had already reached. See, e.g., THE
PERSONAL LETTERS OF STEPHEN WISE 268 (Justine Wise Polier and James Waterman Wise eds.,
John Haynes Holmes intro., Beacon Press 1956).
49. Minutes of the Office Committee Meeting, supra note 40. For a broadly similar view of
how Robinson viewed the IMT during and after the trial, see Marrus, Jacob Robinson and the
Holocaust, supra note 16, at 103–08.
50. One of the prosecutors Robinson implicitly criticized on Walsh’s team, Krieger, used
Nuremberg evidence to publish the earliest Holocaust documentation in English (1947), and
French prosecutor Henri Monneray published the first documentation in French (1947), both cited
supra note 2. Meanwhile, prosecution consultant Raphael Lemkin used his new post in the Pentagon
to assist in the later Nuremberg trials and to urge prosecutors focus on the Holocaust and his genocide theory, especially in the Medical and Flick cases, the latter a case on which Robinson himself
assisted.
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would send a memo to his deputies in February 1947, praising them for
the current cases but urging them to view the Holocaust as the defining
feature of the Nazi regime and to prepare prosecutions that would reflect this centrality. One result was the Einsatzgruppen case; another
was the focus in the Ministries and High Command cases on crimes
against humanity. But if Robinson could not have known those things,
he and WJC President Wise should have shown better judgment than to
send a November 19, 1947, letter to Taylor, with copies leaked elsewhere, complaining about the paucity of cases and citing six uncharged
S.S. leaders. One problem with this letter was that they were complaining about one of their best allies, for Taylor had actually sought to
charge many more Nazis but had been reined in. Another problem was
that the list was factually wrong; most of the men either had been
charged or were confirmed dead.51
While they stumbled by criticizing their allies in 1947, Robinson
and the WJC were right about the larger fact that the Americans, at Nuremberg and elsewhere—and even more so the British, the French, and
the liberated nations—were bringing few new cases and were cutting
back on resources, manpower, and enthusiasm for war crimes trials and
punishment. This was due in part to war weariness and Nazi fatigue,
and in part to unscrupulous Cold War politics. Whatever the balance,
the WJC was accurate, at its second plenary assembly in Montreux in
July 1948, in identifying and denouncing the trend toward clemency and
amnesty for Nazi war criminals. From then on, the WJC was on the
same side as the (former) prosecutors. Both Robinson brothers corresponded with Taylor to help lobby for publication of the Nuremberg
record.52 They and their colleagues wrote Taylor to campaign for new
trials and to oppose the pell-mell rush that began around 1951 to grant
51. See Corporations and Conspiracy, supra note 39, at 1181 nn. 313–15, 1262 (Taylor to
senior staff (Feb. 1947)); id. at 1187–88 nn. 341–48 (letters between Wise and Taylor, Kenneth
Royall, Secretary of the Army, General Daniel Noce, and Colonel Edward Young (Nov.–Dec.
1947)); GENOCIDE ON TRIAL, supra note 38, at 73–75; [WJC] Statement, Extension of the ‘Ministries’ Case to Include Some Additional High Nazis Responsible for the Extirpation of Jews,
November 20, 1947, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file in The Jacob Rader Marcus
Center
of
the
American
Jewish
Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1947-11-20&documentid=C194-3-6&pagenumber=1; Draft Letter from World
Jewish Congress to Telford Taylor, ca. 1947, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file in The
Jacob
Rader
Marcus
Center
of
the
American
Jewish
Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1947-00-00&documentid=C194-3-7&pagenumber=1.
52. The English language record of the first trial was published, but the record of the later
twelve trials was severely cut and published in only limited print runs. Meanwhile the Germanlanguage text was never released.
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clemency to convicted major Nazi defendants. Nehemiah and his colleagues at the IJA also published articles similarly urging trials and opposing clemencies.53
V. JACOB ROBINSON AFTER NUREMBERG
Back in late 1945, when he first returned from Nuremberg, Robinson rejoined his Institute. The IJA continued to produce scholarly and
policy studies, some two dozen in one series alone, over the next few
years, with a small but noticeable turn to domestic issues, such as civil
rights in employment and schooling and veterans’ rights. Robinson
wrote two of them, one on Jews in the Soviet Union, the other on the
unfinished business of victory.54 But he was drawn to international law
and increasingly the international arena. Six months earlier, in May
1945, the WJC and American Jewish Conference, two of the nearly fifty
NGOs that were attached to the American negotiating team, and their
counterparts from the Board of Deputies of British Jews had submitted a
memo to negotiators in San Francisco who were planning the United
Nations—surely the first instance of an NGO petitioning the new organization, and surely a document drafted by Robinson, perhaps with his
fellow delegate Alex Easterman—to urge a stronger basis for the UN
protection of minorities; it was rejected.55 Now, in May 1946, Robinson
returned to the point with his prescient IJA study, “Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in the Charter of the United Nations,” with a focus on national and international jurisdictions and humanitarian inter53. See, e.g., Nehemiah Robinson’s letters to Taylor throughout the 1950s, TELFORD
TAYLOR PAPERS, at box 188, folders 50 and 60; and box 190, folders 96–97. Jacob Robinson’s
letters to Taylor are all from the early 1950s and then the period of the Eichmann trial, are scattered in a dozen boxes. Nehemiah Robinson’s articles on prosecution and clemency over a tenyear span from the late 1940s are on file in the INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box
1, folders 1, 2, and 4; and box 2, folder 6. A number of these letters, memos, and pamphlets by both
brothers, Anatole Goldstein, Robert Marcus, and others are uploaded on the Truman Library website
for
the
years
1948
and
then
1950
and
after.
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/
54. See Jacob Robinson, Jews in the USSR, 1 JEWISH AFFAIRS, March 1, 1946, INSTITUTE
OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box 2; Jacob Robinson, Unfinished Victory, 1 JEWISH
AFFAIRS, Sept. 15, 1946, INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box 2.
55. Though broad human rights language was adopted and Arab League efforts to withdraw
existing guarantees to Jews in Palestine were rebuffed. For the role of Robinson and allied groups
at the San Francisco conference, see the various surveys in American Jewish Conference, Bulletin
of Activities and Digest of the Press (May 18, 1945), at 1–6; Sydney H. Zebel, International
Events, Review of Year 5705-International Events, in 47 AM. JEWISH Y.B. 483, 489–96 (1945);
JOSEPH M. PROSKAUER, A SEGMENT OF MY TIMES 216–28 (Farrar, Straus and Co. 1950). One
insider observed that Robinson aided all three Jewish groups (American Jewish Conference,
World Jewish Conference, and Jewish Agency) represented in San Francisco. Rosenne, supra
note 12, at 290.
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vention. Near the end of 1946, the UN Secretariat hired Robinson as a
consultant to plan the first meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission, which was held in early 1947.
There was little surprise that, in April 1947, Robinson resigned
from the IJA, which was safely in Nehemiah’s hands, to become legal
advisor to the Jewish Agency at the United Nations and, after Israel’s
independence, first legal advisor to Israel’s UN Mission. Within a few
months of assuming his new role, Robinson marked his presence at the
United Nations with another book, Palestine and the United Nations
(1947), documenting the legalities of the worsening situation in Mandatory Palestine and urging an even-handed constructive role for the United Nations.56 Some of his work was legal, some political,57 and some
diplomatic. Abba Eban, Israel’s first ambassador to the United Nations,
later said that, “Robinson did more than anyone else to educate us all to
the potentialities and limitations of multilateral diplomacy.”58
For the next ten years, the Robinson brothers were a Jewish-issues
counterpart to West Point’s famed football backfield of the mid-1940s
that featured “Mr. Inside” and “Mr. Outside.” Jacob was the insider at
Israel’s UN Mission, working in the corridors of power, and Nehemiah
was the outsider at the scholarly IJA, urging new programs, warning of
new dangers, and advising the public. The brothers lived and worked
together, and were surely coordinating their tactics and strengths. Thus,
on international criminal law and development of the Nuremberg principles, Jacob was a leading voice in UN meetings for many years, while
Nehemiah publicized UN developments and used the WJC’s official
consultative status to petition the UN and its constituent organs.59 On
56. Robinson’s friend and colleague Lauterpacht also gave legal help to the Jewish Agency,
in his case after a period of seeming ambivalence. See Eliav Lieblich and Yoram Shachar, Cosmopolitanism at a Crossroads: Hersch Lauterpacht and the Israeli Declaration of Independence,
84 BRIT. Y.B. OF INTL L. 1–51 (2014); REUT YAEL PAZ, A GATEWAY BETWEEN A DISTANT GOD
AND A CRUEL WORLD: THE CONTRIBUTION OF JEWISH GERMAN-SPEAKING SCHOLARS TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 284–92 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2013).
57. It was likely Robinson who helped rally support for the nascent state from prominent
figures like Murray Gurfein, a New York lawyer (and later the judge in the Pentagon Papers case)
who had been on the IJA board in 1941 and a senior Nuremberg prosecutor in 1945. See ABBA
EBAN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 74 (Random House 1977).
58. See EBAN, supra note 57, at 133; Rosenne, supra note 12, at 291–92.
59. Robinson’s many statements in and submissions to the UN regarding international criminal law are in JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 5, folders 10-11, and box 6, folder 2, and briefly
surveyed in Rosenne, supra note 12, at 292. Nehemiah’s outside lobbying is illustrated, e.g., by
Letter from Robert S. Marcus to Trygve Lie accompanied by a Memorandum from the World
Jewish Congress, June 2, 1950, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PAPERS (on file in The Jacob Rader
Marcus
Center
of
the
American
Jewish
Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
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Holocaust compensation, Nehemiah continued to publish and update
books and articles on West German and Austrian legislation for the IJA
and work with Easterman and other experts from the WJC Political and
British Sections. Jacob worked as an insider with Nahum Goldmann and
others in the difficult Wassenaar negotiations, and is credited with being
one of the principal drafters of the Luxembourg Agreements (1952),
which provided for historic reparations by West Germany to both Israel
and individual Holocaust survivors. His typed commentary on the
agreement, with marginalia, may be the closest thing to an ur-text for
that landmark document.60
The brothers did the same with the emerging crime of genocide.
Today, some say that genocide is the crime of crimes or the supreme
crime, and that the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide was an obvious outgrowth of the Holocaust. If
so, it was not obvious at the time. Few nations initially ratified the Convention, and many had concerns about the definition of the crime and
the incursions the Convention seemed to permit on state sovereignty.
Nehemiah’s 1949 commentary is the first and, arguably, still the most
important, gloss on the Convention, and he and other scholars at the IJA
continued to track developments on genocide law in their publications.
For his part, Jacob was almost certainly the strategist for the Israeli Mission as it successfully petitioned the United Nations, along with the
British and French, to permit them to ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the question of reservations to the Genocide Convention. The
question may sound academic, but for Israel, the issue was that Arab
bloc nations might ratify the Convention with variants of a reservation
that created doubt whether they renounced genocide against Israelis.
Using Robinson’s arguments, Shabtai Rosenne, then-legal advisor at the
Mission, and his two European counterparts persuaded the ICJ that uniocumentdate=1950-06-02&documentid=B141-25-1&pagenumber=1; Memorandum Concerning
the Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, World Jewish Congress to the Second Session of
the United Nations International Law Commission, June 2, 1950, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
PAPERS (on file in The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1950-06-02&documentid=C194-3-4&pagenumber=1; and Letter from Robert S.
Marcus and Nehemiah Robinson to the United Nations General Assembly accompanied by a
Memorandum from the World Jewish Congress, October 18, 1950, WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
PAPERS (on file in The Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives),
https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/documents/index.php?d
ocumentdate=1950-10-18&documentid=B141-31-1&pagenumber=1.
60. See JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 6, folder 1; NICHOLAS BALABKINS, WEST
GERMAN REPARATIONS TO ISRAEL 136 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1971); SAGI, supra note 16, at 94–95,
189, 206 (about Nehemiah); id. at 90 (about Jacob Robinson).
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lateral reservations that undercut the heart of a treaty were void (1951).61
After this victory, Jacob continued to make learned presentations
on Israel’s behalf to the UN Sixth Committee and other organs on the
Genocide Convention, aggression, crimes against humanity, an international criminal court, slavery, and the Nuremberg principles. Other matters on which he was active were the Convention on the Declaration of
Death of Missing Persons (1950) and the Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1951). Both were intended as temporary, retrospective agreements, and both might seem technical, but they were of deep
concern to a nation such as Israel, with hundreds of thousands of refugees and missing kinsmen. Joining Robinson at the negotiations was
Gerhart Riegner, an old hand from the WJC and author of the crucial
1942 Riegner telegram that first alerted the world about the Holocaust.
And, reliable as clockwork, the UN Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the Convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing
Persons on which Jacob worked as an insider, were then discussed in
scholarly commentaries by Nehemiah at the IJA (1952).62
Robinson’s most important moment at the United Nations came in
the tense weeks before, during, and after the Suez incursion (October–
November 1956). Meeting constantly with Ambassador Eban and occasionally with Foreign Minister Golda Meir, Robinson served as legal
advisor to Israel as it sought to fend off diplomatic pressure while negotiating withdrawal from the Sinai. Soon after, in summer 1957, despite
widespread praise and respect, a disillusioned Robinson left the United

61. See generally Part II: Public Sittings held at the Peace Palace, The Hague, from April
10th to 14th, and on May 28th, 1951, Oral Statements, Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. (ser. C)
328–57 (May 28, 1951). For the British perspective, see A.W.B. Simpson, Britain and the Genocide Convention, 73 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 5, 39–43 (2002). For continuing difficulties with the law
of treaty reservations in the Genocide Convention and generally, see William A. Schabas,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 615–19 (2d ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2009).
62. The text of many of Jacob Robinson’s later presentations to UN committees are found in
JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 5, folders 10 and 11; and box 6, folder 2, while others can be
found in the negotiations that have been put online for some of these conventions. See, e.g., 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S
137
[hereinafter
1951
Convention],
http://www.unhcr.org/enus/protection/travaux/4ca34be29/refugee-convention-1951-travaux-preparatoires-analysedcommentary-dr-paul.html; see Rosenne, supra note 12, at 292 (regarding Robinson’s central role
in the Declaration of Death Convention); Gilad Ben-Nun, The Israeli Roots of Article 3 and Article 6 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 27 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 101 (2013); Gilad Ben-Nun, The
British-Jewish Roots of Non-Refoulement and its True Meaning for the Drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 28 J. OF REFUGEE STUD. 93 (2015) (regarding Robinson’s role in the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees).
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Nations and returned to his life of research.63 With Nehemiah still leading the IJA and publishing furiously about Jewish issues around the
world—European Jewry Ten Years After the War (1956), and surveys of
Jewish life and anti-Semitic pressures in dozens of countries from Latin
America to Iran—Jacob gathered bibliographic material on the Holocaust and international law, though he occasionally advised Israel on
high-stakes litigation before international tribunals.64 In 1959, Robinson
was honored by scholars and communal leaders around the world on his
seventieth birthday, and he continued to write.
His quiet routines as a scholar and institutional leader were interrupted by the arrival of Adolf Eichmann in Israel, after being abducted
from Argentina on May 11, 1960. Israeli Attorney General Gideon
Hausner, who would lead the prosecution, had only just taken office and
had not previously been involved in the legal planning surrounding
Eichmann’s indictment.65 With the trial now imminent, Hausner recruited Robinson, who had pressed the Allies to charge Eichmann as long
ago as Nuremberg, as his international law specialist. Naturally, Nehemiah at the IJA was also involved, writing an essay in December 1960
about the controversial sale of Eichmann’s memoir to Life magazine by
Eichmann’s wife and another essay as the trial began about the same legal issues on which his brother was the chief advisor.66 Unlike others on
the small prosecution team, Jacob did not argue in court or examine
witnesses, but he was indispensable and can be seen in trial photos sitting next to Hausner. He had declined an invitation to testify as the lead
expert witness—a role that fell to famed historian Salo Baron, to mixed
reviews—but he helped investigators sort through hundreds of survivor
accounts to find witnesses, he defended the trial in scholarly and other
publications, and he is credited with preparing the international law arguments used in court.67 After a four-month trial, Eichmann was con63. EBAN, supra note 57, at 221–22.
64. Rosenne, supra note 12, at 289 n.1 (on international litigation); Boaz Cohen, Setting the
Agenda of Holocaust Research: Discord at Yad Vashem in the 1950s, in HOLOCAUST
HISTORIOGRAPHY, supra note 38, at 255–92 (on politicized research context).
65. The evidence suggests that while officials had been engaged in diplomatic and intelligence efforts to obtain Eichmann since at least late 1957, they had given scant attention to the
legal questions a trial might bring.
66. See, e.g., Are Eichmann’s Memoirs Published in Life Magazine Authentic? (Dec. 5,
1960), INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box 1, folder 3; Eichmann’s Confederates
and the Third Reich Hierarchy (May 1961), INSTITUTE OF JEWISH AFFAIRS COLLECTION, at box
1, folder 2. Jacob also wrote one article and sparred with historian Oscar Handlin afterward. Jacob Robinson, Eichmann and the Question of Jurisdiction, 30 COMMENTARY 1–5 (1960); Oscar
Handlin and Jacob Robinson, Ethics and Eichmann, 30 COMMENTARY 161–63 (1960).
67. See GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 303, 313 (Harper and Row 1966);
HANNA YABLONKA, THE STATE OF ISRAEL VS. EICHMANN 98, 100–06, 147 (Ora Cummings &
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victed and the conviction affirmed, and he was hanged in late May
1962.
Today, the trial is widely seen as fair and the process praised for
being the first trial of a high-level war criminal since the Nuremberg
era. It was the first case to feature the legal theories of universal jurisdiction and genocide, and the first to rely so centrally on survivor testimony. Yet, it is often forgotten that at the time, the legal questions—
seizure, jurisdiction, the Israeli statute, retroactivity, fair trial, venue,
and execution—and behind them the political and moral issues, were
enormously controversial. There were hundreds of newspaper editorials
and essays by what a later generation would call public intellectuals.
Every international lawyer seemed to write about it, as did three senior
Nuremberg participants, one in favor (Kempner) and two more skeptically (Taylor and Wechsler). Argentina brought a formal complaint to
the UN, and foreign governments mostly condemned Israel.68
Without question, the harshest and most influential criticism came
from the noted German Jewish émigré philosopher, Hannah Arendt, in
her 1963 book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of
Evil, which was based on a series of articles she had written for The
New Yorker. Arendt presented the defendant as guilty but ordinary,
honest, free of anti-Semitism, mechanistic, and interesting rather than
evil. She portrayed the prosecution as rigid and error-prone; the survivor
witnesses as overly emotional; the Israeli government as staging a show
trial; the charges as based on sectarian rather than universalistic
grounds; and the Holocaust as so huge that it required, out of necessity,
the significant complicity of Jewish communal leaders.
Many reacted to these shocking characterizations, but in certain
quarters it was feared that Arendt had mastered the voluminous evidence and that only someone with similar mastery could rebut her effectively. Enter Robinson, who wrote a short essay for the AntiDefamation League (1963) and then a 1965 book69 in which he rebutted
Arendt’s points, sometimes line by line. It is accurate on almost all
David Herman trans., Schocken Books 2004). The best evidence of his work is his manuscript
Israel vs. Eichmann: A Study in International, Comparative, and Domestic Law (revised ed., Jan.
1961), in JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 7, folder 4.
68. In time their objections receded, either because Argentina had dropped its UN complaint
after a face-saving compromise, or their own nations sought to avoid the spotlight of trying or
failing to try Nazis, or the Israeli trial turned out to be fair.
69. AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE STRAIGHT: THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH
CATASTROPHE, AND HANNAH ARENDT’S NARRATIVE (Macmillan Co. 1965); A Report on the
Evil of Benality: The Arendt Book, 15 FACTS 263–70 [published by the Anti-Defamation League]
(1963). Robinson’s other related publications are in JACOB ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 7, folder
11.
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points, and new research continues to endorse its findings, but is poorly
written and organized—more a dense list than the polished appraisal
that would be needed against a polemicist as skilled as Arendt. She answered with a contemptuous reply that to her many admirers left her the
victor.70 But if most—not all—general readers felt that way,71 Holocaust
specialists saw it differently.72 They saw, increasingly so, that Robinson
was right on all of his historical points and most of his legal points, and
right to reject, as all serious students of the Holocaust do, Arendt’s
views on Jewish passivity and complicity. Whatever Arendt’s contributions elsewhere or the value of her book for sociology, political theory,
or mass atrocities, it is wrong, even mendacious, about the Holocaust,
Eichmann, and his trial. Yet the unfortunate fate of Robinson’s bestknown, but least-successful book, was that, despite the consensus of
specialists, most readers still regard Arendt’s book as brilliant if flawed,
and Robinson’s, when remembered at all, as an angry, nit-picking, even
if accurate, book.73
Robinson continued to wear multiple hats in the world of communal Jewry.74 From 1957, he had been legal advisor to the Claims Conference and helped establish the research branch of Yad Vashem—
although he typically introduced himself as merely “research coordinator of the four Holocaust institutes”—from which he encouraged joint
scholarly projects to be undertaken and tried to assemble proposed lists
of survivors who could be witnesses in war crimes trials. He worked
70. “The Formidable Dr Robinson”, supra note 15.
71. The drift away from Arendt’s views in at least one non-specialist is illustrated by Isaiah
Berlin. He began with a measure of skepticism about the trial and a noncommittal sympathy for
Arendt, see ISAIAH BERLIN, BUILDING: LETTERS 1960–1975, at 3–4, 93–94, 192, 195–96 (Henry
Hardy and Mark Pottle eds., Chatto and Windus 2013). A decade later, however, he was baffled
at the spell she seemed to have over their many mutual friends and repeatedly denounced her as
he did almost nobody else of his vast circle, writing that she and her views were “dreadful,” “contemptible,” and “terrible on this (as on many things).” ISAIAH BERLIN, AFFIRMING: LETTERS
1975–1997, 41, 252, 277, 297–300, 314–15, 362, 389, 462–64, 503 (Henry Hardy and Mark Pottle eds., Chatto and Windus 2015) (quotations respectively at 314, 389, 277).
72. This includes Raul Hilberg, who defended some of her claims but whose own controversial views were far more nuanced. He also loathed the way Arendt distorted his views to support
hers, and later moved away from even those views that were sympathetic to hers. See Jonathan A.
Bush, Raul Hilberg (1926– 2007) In Memoriam, 100 JEWISH Q. REV. 661, 673–76, 679–80 (Fall
2010) 673–76, 679–80.
73. See generally Richard I. Cohen, A Generation’s Response to ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem’,
in HANNAH ARENDT IN JERUSALEM 253, 266–67 (Steven E. Aschheim ed., 2001). Contrary to
popular belief, Robinson was not an automatic defender of all aspects of the trial; for instance, he
questioned the death sentence, albeit on practical rather than legal grounds. YABLONKA, supra
note 67, at 147.
74. This and the next paragraphs are largely based on Robinson’s correspondence in JACOB
ROBINSON PAPERS, at box 1, 8, and 9.
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with his brother’s IJA, the national affiliates of the World Jewish Congress, and other groups. He corresponded with officials, rabbis, survivors, and old allies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and, of course,
Israel, Germany, and throughout the United States, and was seen as an
indispensable counselor. He steered funds to a steady stream of survivors who came in penury to him and his brother, and to scholars and
memorial projects; but he lived modestly, residing as he had since 1941,
on Riverside Drive with his wife and two daughters, his brother, and
sister-in-law—all of whom helped in his work.
But his immediate world grew darker. His intimate co-author, Nehemiah, died young in January 1964, as had another beloved co-author,
his daughter Vita, of leukemia in 1955. The rise of other, more specialized research and advocacy groups meant that the IJA was less central,
and—perhaps because it no longer had Nehemiah’s energy anchoring it
in New York—it relocated to London in 1965. Jacob was left with more
time for his research, which he pursued unabated. Continuing the bibliographic series of unpublished Holocaust evidence that he had begun
with the late Philip Friedman in 1960,75 Robinson, together with scholars at Hebrew University, published new volumes starting in 1965. His
1967 bibliography of international law and legal sources is sadly forgotten today, but it itemizes and assesses over two thousand sources in
dozens of languages, including older manuals and periodicals by Slavic
and Asian authors that cannot be found in any major American library.
It was a return to the basic research that had marked his first major publication, a two-volume 1928 bibliographic compilation of the legal protections for minorities under the League of Nations. His last major bibliographic work was, fittingly, a 1976 digest of the Nuremberg
evidence, co-edited with Henry Sachs. At a time when the Nuremberg
trials are breezily cited everywhere, but the body of evidence is too vast
and unwieldy for all but a few specialists to access, Robinson’s calendar
is the gold standard for serious researchers. In 1977, soon after the digest was completed, Robinson died.

75. See generally Roni Stauber, Philip Friedman and the Beginning of Holocaust Studies, in
HOLOCAUST HISTORIOGRAPHY, supra note 38, at 83–102. A dozen years earlier Robinson had
helped bring Friedman to New York. Id. at 91.

